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Abstract
Machine learning is increasingly used in security-critical
applications, such as autonomous driving, face recog-
nition and malware detection. Most learning methods,
however, have not been designed with security in mind
and thus are vulnerable to different types of attacks. This
problem has motivated the research field of adversarial
machine learning that is concerned with attacking and de-
fending learning methods. Concurrently, a different line
of research has tackled a very similar problem: In digital
watermarking information are embedded in a signal in the
presence of an adversary. As a consequence, this research
field has also extensively studied techniques for attacking
and defending watermarking methods.
The two research communities have worked in parallel
so far, unnoticeably developing similar attack and defense
strategies. This paper is a first effort to bring these commu-
nities together. To this end, we present a unified notation
of black-box attacks against machine learning and water-
marking that reveals the similarity of both settings. To
demonstrate the efficacy of this unified view, we apply
concepts from watermarking to machine learning and vice
versa. We show that countermeasures from watermarking
can mitigate recent model-extraction attacks and, simi-
larly, that techniques for hardening machine learning can
fend off oracle attacks against watermarks. Our work pro-
vides a conceptual link between two research fields and
thereby opens novel directions for improving the security
of both, machine learning and digital watermarking.
1 Introduction
In the last years, machine learning has become the tool
of choice in many areas of engineering. Learning meth-
ods are thus not only applied in classic settings, such
as speech and handwriting recognition, but increasingly
operate at the core of security-critical applications. For
example, self-driving cars make use of deep learning for
recognizing objects and street signs [e.g., 32, 66]. Sim-
ilarly, systems for surveillance and access control often
build on machine learning methods for identifying faces
and persons [e.g. 49, 54]. Finally, several detection sys-
tems for malicious software integrate learning methods
for analyzing data more effectively [e.g., 29, 30, 33].
Machine learning, however, has originally not been de-
signed with security in mind. Many learning methods suf-
fer from vulnerabilities that enable an adversary to thwart
their successful application—either during the training or
prediction phase. This problem has motivated the research
field of adversarial machine learning which is concerned
with the theory and practice of learning in an adversarial
environment [27, 35, 42]. As part of this research, several
attacks and defenses have been proposed, for example,
for poisoning support vector machines [9, 10], crafting
adversarial samples against neural networks [40, 41, 43]
or stealing models from decision trees [56].
Concurrently to adversarial machine learning, a differ-
ent line of research has faced very similar problems: In
digital watermarking information is embedded in a signal,
such as an image, in the presence of an adversary [15, 46].
This adversary seeks to extract or remove the informa-
tion from the signal, thereby reversing the watermarking
process and obtaining an unmarked copy of the signal,
for example, for illegally distributing copyrighted con-
tent. As a consequence, methods for digital watermarking
naturally operate in an adversarial environment and sev-
eral types of attacks and defenses have been proposed
for watermarking methods, such as sensitivity and oracle
attacks [e.g., 1, 12, 14, 21].
Unfortunately, the two research communities have
worked in parallel so far and unnoticeably developed
similar attack and defense strategies. To illustrate this
similarity, let us consider the simplified attacks shown
in Figure 1: The middle plot corresponds to an evasion
attack against a learning method, similar to the attacks
proposed by Papernot et al. [40, 41]. A few pixels of the
target image have been carefully manipulated, such that
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the digit 5 is misclassified as 8. By contrast, the right plot
shows an oracle attack against a watermarking method,
similar to the attacks developed by Westfeld [62] and Cox
& Linnartz [14]. Again, a few pixels have been changed;
this time however to render the watermark unreadable in
the target image.
Target image with
watermark.
Evasion attack
(Misclassified
as 8).
Oracle attack
(Broken
watermark).
Figure 1: Examples of attacks against machine learning and digital
watermarking. Middle: the target is modified, such that it is misclassified
as 8. Right: the target is modified, such that the watermark is destroyed.
While both attacks address different goals, the under-
lying attack strategy is surprisingly similar. In fact, both
attacks aim at minimally modifying the target, such that
a decision boundary is crossed. In the case of machine
learning, this boundary separates different classes, such as
the digits. In the case of digital watermarking, the bound-
ary discriminates watermarked from unmarked signals.
Although this example illustrates only a single attack type,
it becomes apparent that there is a conceptual similarity
between learning and watermarking attacks.
In this paper, we strive for bringing these two research
fields together and systematically study the similarities of
learning and watermarking methods under an adversary’s
presence with black-box access. To this end, we intro-
duce a unified notation for attacks against learning and
watermarking methods, which enables us to reason about
their inner workings and abstract from the concrete attack
setting. This unified view allows for transferring concepts
from machine learning to digital watermarking and vice
versa. As a result, we are able to apply defenses developed
for watermarks to learning methods as well as transferring
machine learning defenses to digital watermarking.
We empirically demonstrate the efficacy of this unified
view in two case studies. First, we show that stateful
defenses from digital watermarking can effectively miti-
gate model-extraction attacks against decision trees [56].
Second, we show that techniques for hardening machine
learning with classifier diversity [6] can be successfully
applied to block oracle attacks against watermarks. In
addition, we provide further examples of attacks and de-
fenses, transferable between the research fields. By doing
so, we establish several links between the two research
fields and identify novel directions for improving the secu-
rity of both, machine learning and digital watermarking.
In summary, we make the following major contribu-
tions in this paper:
• Machine learning meets digital watermarking. We
present a novel view on black-box attacks against
learning and watermarking methods that exposes pre-
viously unknown similarities between both research
fields.
• Transfer of attacks and defenses. Our unified view
enables transferring concepts from machine learning
to digital watermarking and vice versa, giving rise
to novel attacks and defenses.
• Case studies with two novel defenses. We present
and evaluate two novel defenses that are derived
from our unified view and mitigate model-extraction
attacks and oracle attacks, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we review the background of adversarial machine
learning and digital watermarking. We introduce our uni-
fied view on both research fields in Section 3 and present
case studies with defenses in Section 4. We discuss the
implications of our work in Section 5 and conclude in
Section 6.
2 Background
Whenever machine learning or digital watermarking are
applied in security-critical applications, one needs to ac-
count for the presence of an attacker. This adversary
may try to attack the learning/watermarking process and
thereby impact the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of the application. This section provides a basic
introduction to the motivation and threat scenarios in ma-
chine learning and digital watermarking, before Section 3
systematizes them under a common notation. A reader
familiar with one of the two fields may directly proceed
to Section 3.
2.1 Adversarial Machine Learning
Machine learning has become an integral part of many
applications in computer science and engineering, rang-
ing from handwriting recognition to autonomous driving.
The success of machine learning methods is rooted in its
capability to automatically infer patterns and relations
from large amounts of data [see 17, 26]. However, this in-
ference is usually not robust against attacks and thus may
be disrupted or deceived by an adversary. These attacks
can be roughly categorized into three classes: poisoning,
evasion and model extraction [42]. The latter two are the
focus of our work, as they have concrete counterparts in
the area of digital watermarking.
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Evasion attacks. In this attack setting, the adversary
attempts to thwart the prediction of a trained classifier
and evade a detection. To this end, the attacker carefully
manipulates characteristics of the data provided to the
classifier to change the predicted class. As a result, the
attack impacts the integrity of the prediction. For ex-
ample, in the case of spam filtering, the adversary may
omit words from spam emails indicative for unsolicited
content [36]. A common variant of this attack type are
mimicry attacks, in which the adversary mimics charac-
teristics of a particular class to hinder a correct prediction
[19, 52]. Evasion and mimicry attacks have been success-
fully applied against different learning-based systems, for
example in network intrusion detection [20, 52], malware
detection [25, 53, 65] and face recognition [50].
Depending on the adversary’s knowledge about the
classifier, evasion attacks can be conducted in a black-
box or white-box setting. In the black-box setting, no
information about the learning method and its training
data are available and the adversary needs to guide her
attack along the predicted classes of the classifier [35,
40, 60]. With increasing knowledge of the method and
data, the probability of a successful evasion rises [7].
In such a white-box setting, the adversary may exploit
leaked training data to build a surrogate model and then
determine what feature combinations have the most effect
on prediction.
Model extraction. In this attack setting, the adver-
sary actively probes a learning method and analyzes the
returned output to reconstruct the underlying learning
model [35]. This attack, denoted as model extraction or
model stealing, impacts the confidentiality of the learning
model. It may allow the adversary to gain insights on the
training data as well as obtain a suitable surrogate model
for preparing evasion attacks.
Depending on the output, the adversary also operates
in either a black-box or white-box setting. If only the
predicted classes are observable, extracting the learning
model is more challenging, whereas if function values are
returned or learning parameters are available the adver-
sary can more quickly approximate the learning model.
As an example, the recent attacks proposed by Trame`r
et al. [56] enable reconstructing learning models from
different publicly available machine learning services in
black-box as well as white-box settings. Moreover, model
extraction poses a serious risk to the privacy of users, as
the attack may enable to derive private information from
the reconstructed model [51].
2.2 Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking allows for verifying the authenticity
of digital media, like images, music or videos. Digital wa-
termarks are frequently used for copyright protection and
identifying illegally distributed content [5]. Technically,
a watermark is attached to a medium by embedding a pat-
tern into the signal of the medium, such that the pattern
is imperceptible and inseparable. A particular challenge
for this embedding is the robustness of the watermark,
which should persist under common media processing,
such as compression and denoising. There exist several
approaches for creating robust watermarks and we refer
the reader to the comprehensive overview provided by
Cox et al. [15].
As an example, Figure 2 shows a simple watermarking
scheme where a random pattern is added to the pixels of
an image. The induced changes remain (almost) unnotice-
able, yet the presence of the watermark can be detected by
correlating the watermarked image with the original wa-
termark. Appendix A illustrates this simple watermarking
scheme in more detail.
Original Image Watermark Target image with
watermark
Figure 2: Example of a digital watermark. A random noise pattern is
added to the image in the spatial domain. The pattern is not observable
but detectable.
Similar to machine learning, watermarking methods
need to account for the presence of an adversary and with-
stand different forms of attacks [14, 21]. While there exist
several attacks based on information leaks and embed-
ding artifacts that are unique to digital watermarking [e.g.,
4, 15], we identify two attack classes that correspond to
black-box evasion and model-extraction attacks.
Oracle attacks. In this attack scenario, the adversary
has access to a watermark detector that can be used to
check whether a given media sample contains a watermark
or not [14]. Such a detector can be an online platform
verifying the authenticity of images as well as a media
player that implements digital rights management. Given
this detector, the attacker can launch an oracle attack in
which she iteratively modifies a watermarked medium un-
til the watermark is undetectable. The attack thus impacts
the integrity of the pattern embedded in the signal.
While it is trivial to destroy the pattern and the coupled
signal, for example using massive changes to the medium,
carefully removing the watermark while preserving the
original signal is a notable challenge. As a consequence,
a large variety of different attack strategies has been pro-
posed [e.g., 12, 14, 16, 28]. A prominent example is the
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Figure 3: A unified view on machine learning and digital watermarking. Top: A machine learning setup including a feature space, a learning classifier
and corresponding attacks. Bottom: A watermarking setup including the media space, the watermark detector and corresponding attacks. The red
dashed line illustrates model extraction/watermark estimation, while the red arrow shows an evasion attack/oracle attack.
Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack, where no prior knowl-
edge about the detector’s decision function is required
and which has been successfully applied against several
watermarking schemes (see Appendix B).
Watermark estimation. In the second setting, the ad-
versary also has access to a watermark detector, yet her
goal is not only to remove the watermark from a target
medium but to estimate its pattern [11, 38]. The attack
thus impacts the confidentiality of the watermark and not
only allows to perfectly remove the pattern from the sig-
nal but also enables forging the watermark onto arbitrary
other data. This watermark estimation poses a severe
threat to watermarking methods, as it may completely un-
dermine security mechanisms for copyright protection and
access control. However, estimating the pattern embed-
ded in a medium is difficult and requires a considerable
number of queries to the watermark detector to identify
discriminative features in the signal.
3 Unifying Adversarial Learning
and Digital Watermarking
It is evident from the previous section that attacks against
learning and watermarking methods share similarities—
an observation that has surprisingly been overlooked by
the two research communities [2]. Throughout this sec-
tion, we systematically identify the similarities and show
that it is possible to transfer knowledge about attacks and
defenses from one field to the other. An overview of this
systematization is presented in Figure 3. We guide our
systematization of machine learning and digital water-
marking along the following four concepts:
1. Data Representation. Machine learning and water-
marking make use of similar data representations,
which enables putting corresponding learning and de-
tection methods into the same context (Section 3.1)
2. Problem setting. Watermarking can be seen as a spe-
cial case of a binary classification. Consequently, bi-
nary classifiers and watermarking techniques tackle
a similar problem (Section 3.2).
3. Attacks. Due to the similar representation and prob-
lem setting, attacks overlap between both fields, as
we discuss for evasion attacks (Section 3.3) and
model extraction (Section 3.4).
4. Defenses. Defenses developed in one research field
often fit the corresponding attack in the other field
and thus can be transferred due to the similar data
representation and problem setting (Section 3.5).
In the following, we discuss each of these concepts in
more detail, where we first formalize the concept for ma-
chine learning and then proceed to digital watermarking.
3.1 Feature Space vs. Media Space
Machine learning. Learning methods typically operate
on a so-called feature space that captures the characteris-
tics of the data to be analyzed and learned. These features
4
correspond to vectors x ∈ RN and in the case of classi-
fication are assigned to a class label y that needs to be
learned and predicted, such as C+ and C− in Figure 3(a).
Note that feature spaces in machine learning can also be
constructed implicitly, for example using non-linear maps
and kernel functions [17, 48].
Digital watermarking. Similar to machine learning,
watermarking methods operate on a signal available
in some underlying media space, such as the pixels of
an image or the audio waves of a recording. Without
loss of generality, this signal can be described as a
vector x ∈ RN and thus the media space corresponds to
the feature space used in machine learning. Note that
advanced watermarking schemes often map the signal
to other spaces, such as frequency or random subspace
domains [15, 21]. Still, the mapped signals can be
described as points in a vector space.
Consequently, the feature space of a learning method
is closely related to the media space used in digital wa-
termarking. The relation remains unchanged even if a
feature mapping is performed, as long as an implicit vec-
tor representation exists.
3.2 Classifier vs. Watermark Detector
Machine learning. After embedding the training data
into a feature space, the actual learning process is per-
formed using a learning method, such as a support vector
machine or a neural network. In the case of classification,
this learning method tries to infer functional dependencies
from the training data to separate data points of different
classes. These dependencies are described in a learning
model w that parameterizes a decision function fw(x).
Given a vector x the function fw(x) predicts a class label
or a corresponding numerical prediction score.
Digital watermarking. The media space in watermark-
ing is divided in two separate subspaces as depicted in
Figure 3(d) where the marked and unmarked versions of
the signal represent the two classes. Note that a robust
watermark should ideally survive image processing steps,
such as compression and denoising. Therefore, the water-
mark class implicitly contains variations as well, just as
machine learning captures the variations of samples from
a class through its generalization.
If we denote an unmarked signal as x and a water-
marked signal as x˜, the relation between x and x˜ is given
by a parameter w that defines the pattern of the watermark.
As a consequence, a watermark detector also employs a
function fw(x) to determine which subspace a signal is in
and thus whether it contains the watermark. Similar to
machine learning, the function fw may induce a linear as
well as non-linear boundary, such as a polynomial [22] or
fractalized boundary [37].
Altogether, both fields perform a classification and an
adversary faces the same situation: a decision boundary
separates two classes either in feature or media space.
Consequently black-box attacks that work through input-
output observations are quite transferable between ma-
chine learning and digital watermarking. We emphasize
that the boundary does not need to be the same. Our focus
lies on the corresponding attack strategy. In the following
sections, we discuss this similarity and provide a map-
ping between machine learning and watermarking attacks,
which lays the ground for transferring defenses from one
field to the other.
3.3 Evasion Attack vs. Oracle Attack
As the first attack mapping, we consider the pair of eva-
sion and oracle attacks in a black-box setting. In this
attack scenario, an adversary targets the integrity of the
classifier’s response by inducing a misclassification from
an iteratively collected set of input-output pairs. This kind
of attack has been proposed for learning-based classifiers
as well as watermark detectors.
Machine learning. In an evasion attack, the adversary
tries to manipulate a sample with minimal changes, such
that it is misclassified by the decision function fw. For-
mally, the attack can thus be described as an optimization
problem,
arg min
t
d(t) s.t. fw(x+ t) = y∗ , (1)
where d(t) reflects the necessary changes t on the original
sample x to achieve the wanted prediction y∗. Depend-
ing on the particular output of the learning classifier, the
attacker can run different attack strategies:
• Numerical output. In this case, the classifier returns
a prediction score fw(x) and the attacker tries to
mislead the classifier with as minimal changes as
possible. For example, the adversary can perform
a gradient descent in the direction of the decision
boundary to determine the features that have the
most effect on the classification [7, 41].
• Binary output. In the second case, the classifier
only returns the predicted class label. This clearly
restricts the attacker’s capabilities, since not every
change of a feature influences the classifier’s output.
Still, an adversary can perform a line search through
the binary responses to locate the boundary’s posi-
tion [35]. An attacker can also learn a substitute
model based on a set of queries that approximates
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the original model [39, 40]. The attack iteratively
sends new queries in regions where the substitute
model is less confident. This allows an evasion even
with highly non-linear models, such as deep neural
networks.
Depending on the concrete scenario the attacker might
also have to satisfy additional constraints. For instance, it
might not be sufficient to just cross the decision boundary.
Instead, the modified sample also needs to be located
inside the distribution of the target class [7].
Digital watermarking. In an oracle attack, an adver-
sary tries to disturb or even remove the watermark embed-
ded in a medium. The attack setting is closely related to
evasion. Formally, the underlying optimization problem
is given by
arg min
t
d(t) s.t. fw(x˜+ t) = y− , (2)
where d(t) reflects the changes t on the watermarked
signal x˜ and y− corresponds to no detection. The opti-
mization problem is identical to the one given in Eq. (1),
so that the adversary can apply similar attack strategies.
We can again categorize these strategies depending on the
output returned by the watermark detector.
• Numerical output. In this case, the watermark de-
tector outputs the score fw(x˜) of the decision func-
tion. As for evasion, the adversary can perform an
attack based on gradient descent to remove the wa-
termark x˜ from the image with as little changes as
possible [14].
• Binary output. In this setting, the adversary has
only access to the binary output of the watermark
detector. As a watermark detector usually does not
need to return more information than necessary, the
watermarking literature generally focuses on this set-
ting. Similar to the evasion case, it is possible to
perform a line search to locate the decision boundary
and remove the watermark [e.g., 12]. We present
a novel defense against this type of attack in Sec-
tion 4 which is inspired by concepts from adversarial
machine learning.
Due to the equivalent objectives in Eq. (1) and (2),
attack strategies from machine learning are transferable
to watermarks and vice versa. Take, for instance, the
state-of-the-art Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack [12]
that solves the optimization problem from Eq. (2) by
performing a gradient descent based on binary outputs.
This makes the attack also applicable against non-linear
learning classifiers. Appendix B recaps the attack
procedure in more detail. The optimal solution is
guaranteed for convex boundaries, but suitable results are
also reported for non-linear watermarking schemes by
following the boundary’s envelope [12, 13].
We conclude that evasion attacks on classifiers and
oracle attacks on watermark detectors share fundamen-
tal similarities in the black-box setting. The underlying
optimization problems are identical and thus several of
the existing attack and defense strategies can be directly
exchanged from one research area to the other.
3.4 Model Extraction
As the second attack mapping, we consider the pair of
model extraction and watermark estimation. In the black-
box scenario, the adversary aims at compromising the
confidentiality of a learning model or digital watermark
by sending specifically crafted objects to a given classi-
fier/detector and observing the respective binary output.
Machine learning. Model-extraction attacks center on
an effective strategy for querying a classifier, such that the
underlying model can be reconstructed with few queries.
For instance, Trame`r et al. [56] have recently demon-
strated this threat by stealing models from cloud platforms
providing machine learning as a service. In contrast to
evasion, the extraction of the learning model w enables
the adversary to also reconstruct the decision function fw
and to apply it to arbitrary data. We can differentiate two
attack strategies here:
• Approximation. In the first case, an attacker col-
lects a number of input-output pairs with queries
either scattered over the feature space or created
adaptively [39, 40, 56]. These observations allow the
adversary to learn an own surrogate model. While
this strategy is easy to implement, it only yields an
approximation of the original model, which becomes
more accurate the more observations are conducted.
• Reconstruction. The localization of points on the
decision boundary through a line search enables an
exact reconstruction of the model. For example, an
adversary can reconstruct a linear classifier by per-
forming a line search in each feature direction from
a fixed position [35]. The distance from this position
to the located boundary leaks the respective feature
weight in that direction. The extraction against non-
linear classifiers such as decision trees also exploits
localized boundary points for reconstruction [56].
We discuss the latter attack in more detail in Sec-
tion 4 when presenting a novel defense against it,
inspired by concepts from digital watermarking.
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Defenses Research FieldAdversarial Learning Watermarking
Randomization Random Subspace Method [8] Random Subspace Method [18, 57]Randomized Ensemble [8, 31] Randomized Boundary [21, 34]
— Union of Watermarks [21]
Complex Boundary
Non-Linearity [6, 47] Non-Linearity [21–23, 37]
Classifier Diversity [6] —
— Snake Traps [21]
Stateful Analysis — Security Margin [1, 55]— Line Search Detection [1]
— Locality-Sensitive Hashing [58]
Table 1: Comparison of defense techniques introduced by adversarial learning and digital watermarking.
Digital watermarking. Watermark estimation repre-
sents the counterpart to model extraction. In this attack
scenario, the adversary seeks to reconstruct the watermark
w from a marked signal x˜. If successful, the adversary
is not only capable of perfectly removing the watermark
w from the signal x˜, but also of embedding w in other
signals, thereby effectively creating forgeries.
Similar to the model extraction case, estimation
attacks in the watermarking literature are based on
localizing boundary points where the signal just crosses
the detector’s decision boundary [11, 37]. A watermark
with a linear boundary, for instance, can be recovered
from a linear number of discovered boundary points.
Choubassi and Moulin present a variant of this estimation
attack to find boundary points that reduce the effort of the
subsequent watermark estimation [11]. This approach
already comes very close to the work of Lowd and
Meek [35] from adversarial machine learning.
As digital watermarking and machine learning use a
decision boundary to separate inputs, a natural attack strat-
egy consists in localizing this boundary through queries
and then combining the gathered points to reconstruct the
model or watermark.
3.5 Defenses
The communities of both research fields have extensively
worked on developing defenses to fend off the attacks
presented in the previous sections. However, it is usually
much easier to create an attack that compromises a secu-
rity goal, than devising a defense that effectively stops a
class of attacks. As a result, several of the developed de-
fenses only protect from very specific attacks and it is still
an open question how learning methods and watermark
detectors can be generally protected from the influence
of an adversary. In this section, we provide an overview
of current defenses and identify similarities as well as
interesting directions for transferring a defense strategy
from one field to the other (see Table 1). We also include
defenses from adversarial learning that were initially pre-
sented against informed attacks, but also work when an
adversary acts in a black-box setting.
Randomization. A simple yet effective strategy to im-
pede attacks against classifiers and watermark detectors
builds on the introduction of randomness. Several tech-
niques have been proposed in both fields which add ele-
ments of randomization to the learning or detection pro-
cess. While these defenses cannot rule out successful
attacks, the induced indeterminism obstructs simple at-
tack strategies and requires more thorough concepts for
evasion or model extraction.
In machine learning, randomized ensemble learning
has been proposed for implementing this defense strat-
egy [8, 44]. Each classifier in an ensemble is built with
a random subset of the training data and the prediction
is retrieved by aggregating the output of all classifiers.
As a consequence, the adversary has to attack different
classifiers at the same time [8]. Alternatively, the features
selected to train each classifier can be randomized, such
that an adversary cannot be sure whether a specific fea-
ture has an influence on the returned classifier output [60].
This is known as the random subspace method in the ma-
chine learning field. Overall, randomizing the training
data and features raises the bar for all discussed attacks,
since the adversary has to spend more effort into gain-
ing background knowledge on the underlying decision
boundary and model.
Similar techniques have been proposed to defeat at-
tacks on watermarking detection. In particular, a detector
can be hardened by creating a randomized region around
the decision boundary where the detector returns arbitrary
outputs [21, 34]. This misleads the inherent line search
in attacks that localize the boundary in this way [11, 12].
Moreover, equivalent to the random subspace method
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in machine learning, several works in the field of water-
marking propose to randomly divide the image pixels
into subsets and aggregate the classifier output from each
subset [18, 57].
In addition, the Broken Arrows watermarking scheme
creates several watermarks that form a union of water-
marks. During detection, only the watermark with the
smallest distance to the current signal is applied [21].
This mitigates the risk that an adversary could compare
multiple images with the same watermark. This defense
has not been applied to learning methods yet. It would
correspond to an ensemble of classifiers where only one
classifier is applied during prediction depending on the
input sample.
Complex boundary. Another strategy for obstructing
attacks is the selection of a complex decision bound-
ary. Without sufficient knowledge on the structure of
the boundary, it is difficult to attack a method and the
adversary is required to invest more resources to circum-
vent the defense. However, increasing the complexity of a
decision function is not trivial, as a fine-grained boundary
can also lead to overfitting and further possibilities for
evasion [see 41].
Recent work on adversarial machine learning thus pro-
poses to increase the complexity of the decision boundary
but at the same time to enclose the learned data tightly. In
the case of malware detection, this implies that an evasion
attack needs to contain plausible features of the benign
class without losing the malicious functionality. Russu
et al. implement this defense strategy using non-linear
kernel functions [47], while Biggio et al. realize a tighter
and more complex boundary through the combination of
two-class and one-class models [6]. Although invented
against attackers with a surrogate model, these counter-
measures also tackle black-box attacks that need to probe
the feature space with queries outside the training data
distribution. We use this strategy in Section 4.1 to address
a watermark oracle attack.
Similarly, the watermarking community has exam-
ined non-linear boundaries to defend against oracle and
watermark-estimation attacks [22, 23, 37]. These bound-
aries range from polynomial to non-parametric fractals
and obstruct e.g. attacks that estimate the decision bound-
ary. In addition, Furon and Bas have introduced small
indents called snake traps at the decision boundary in
order to stop attacks based on random walks along the
detection region [16, 21].
While all of the defenses listed in Table 1 using a com-
plex boundary render attacks more difficult, it is often not
clear whether they provide protection in the long run. For
example, boundaries based on fractals and snake traps
block some of the attacks presented in Section 3, yet ap-
proximations of the decision boundary are still possible
and might be used for successful attacks [12].
Stateful analysis. If the learning method or watermark
detector is outside of the attacker’s control, an active de-
fense strategy becomes possible, in which the defender
seeks to identify sequences of malicious queries. For in-
stance, a cloud service providing machine learning as a
service may monitor incoming queries for patterns indica-
tive of evasion and model-extraction attacks.
While this concept has not yet been examined in ad-
versarial machine learning, stateful analysis of queries
has been successfully applied in digital watermark-
ing for detecting oracle and watermark-estimation at-
tacks [1, 55, 58]. These defenses exploit the fact that
an adversary first needs to perform an unusual number of
queries close to the boundary in order to exactly locate its
position. Thus, it is possible to detect attempts to attack
the detector and infer the decision boundary.
Consequently, Table 1 shows that stateful defenses have
only been applied to watermarking schemes, providing
the opportunity for constructing novel defenses for learn-
ing methods. We show in a case study in Section 4 that
model-extraction attacks can be mitigated with the secu-
rity margin concept if the learning system is not under
full control of the adversary and it is possible to monitor
incoming queries.
4 Transfer of Attacks and Defenses
We proceed to present two case studies that exemplify
how concepts from one research field can be transferred
to the other. As the first case study, we apply a concept
proposed by Biggio et al. [6] for securing machine learn-
ing to a watermark detector. We demonstrate that the
resulting detector mitigates a state-of-the-art oracle attack.
In the second case study, we apply the concept of stateful
detection to a machine learning method and show that this
combination effectively tackles model-extraction attacks
against decision trees. While these case studies focus on
two particular defenses, we encourage the communities
to work with each other and therefore summarize further
directions for research in Section 5.
4.1 From Machine Learning
to Watermarking
In our first case study, we consider a recent defense from
machine learning that increases the complexity of the
decision boundary by combining a two-class and one-
class model [6]. Figure 4(a) schematically illustrates the
concept of this defense, which effectively creates a blend
between two independent learning methods:
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Figure 4: Transfer from machine learning to watermarking: The left plot shows the combination of a two-class and one-class learning model to build
a so-called 1.5-class classifier. The right plot shows our novel defense for watermarking that also combines a two-class and one-class detector.
• Two-class models. The objective of this learning
setting is to discriminate objects from two classes.
However, unpopulated regions, such as the top-left
corner in Figure 4(a), are not excluded from this
classification, which leads to a weak spot: an at-
tacker can try to evade the classification by creating
arbitrary samples on the selected subspace of the
decision function—irrespective of the distribution of
the target class.
• One-class models. In this learning setting, only one
class is modeled and the decision boundary sepa-
rates this class from the rest of the feature space.
Figure 4(a) exemplifies the concept by showing the
learned boundary around the classes. One-class mod-
els enable identifying implausible points, as they
tightly enclose the training data and thereby help to
mitigate the weak spot of common two-class models.
If we combine the decision boundary of both models,
we obtain a hybrid form denoted as “1.5-class classifier”.
This classifier discriminates two classes but also requires
these classes to lie within specific regions of the feature
space. As a result, evasion attacks become more difficult,
since an adversary needs to stay within the one-class
regions when moving towards the decision boundary.
This simple yet effective idea has been proposed for
learning methods but has not been applied in the context
of digital watermarking. In fact, existing watermarking
schemes mainly focus on discriminating marked from
unmarked signals and neglect how these are distributed
in the media space, leading to the same weak spot. An
adversary can therefore exploit the full media space to
trigger varying reactions to the respective inputs in or-
der to collect information about the watermark. Broadly
speaking, ”the image does not have to look nice“ in an
attack [63]. The so-created points do not necessarily re-
semble a meaningful signal, but the detector still accepts
these points. The Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack from
Section 3.3, for instance, needs to find a starting position
on the decision boundary. Without further information
about the boundary’s location, an attacker can thus per-
form a line search in a random direction or set pixels to
gray iteratively (see Figure 5 for the resulting images).
Consequently, the defense from the learning commu-
nity provides us with a new research direction to tackle
oracle attacks in digital watermarking. Figure 4(b) depicts
a possible 1.5-class watermark detector that works as fol-
lows: The two-class detector enables us to distinguish
unmarked from watermarked signals, while the one-class
detector enables spotting implausible signals, that is, too
far away from reasonable variations. In particular, the
two-class detector decides on the presence of a water-
mark only if the input lies within the one-class region.
Outside, the detector returns random decisions or alterna-
tively blocks access for subsequent queries from the same
source (see Section 3.5).
To model plausible signals, the 1.5-class watermark
detector is trained with samples of honest variations of
the target image, such as strong changes of the bright-
ness, compression or denoising. Figure 5 depicts possible
variations with distortions where the detector should still
decide on watermark presence.
Experimental setup. To demonstrate the practical util-
ity of this novel defense, we conduct an empirical eval-
uation with a state-of-the-art oracle attack. Our dataset
for this evaluation consists of images from the publicly
available Dresden Image Database [24], where 50 un-
compressed Adobe Lightroom images from a Nikon D70
camera are used. All images are converted to grayscale
and cropped to a common size of 128×128 pixels, that
is, N = 16834 dimensions.
Our experimental procedure is as follows: The water-
mark embedding and detection process follow the pre-
sented scheme in Appendix A that yields a linear decision
boundary and that represents the two-class detector. To
obtain the respective one-class detector, we create dif-
ferent variations of the watermarked image x˜ by apply-
ing common image processing steps, such as noise addi-
tion, denoising, JPEG compression as well as contrast-
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Figure 5: Distortions of the target image. The left four plots show
plausible image distortions. The right plots depict boundary starting
positions for an attack where the one-class detector gives an alarm.
and brightness variation. We apply neighborhood-based
anomaly detection to define a simple model of normality.
Given an image x˜, this model computes the distance d to
the k-nearest variation of x˜, that is,
d(x˜) =
1
k ∑v∈Nx˜
‖v− x˜‖ (3)
where Nx˜ are the k-nearest neighbors of x˜. We mark
an image as implausible if the distance to its k-nearest
variations reaches a given threshold δ . For our study, we
simply fix k = 3. We attack our 1.5-class detector using
the well-studied Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack [3, 12,
13] that successfully defeats several existing defenses (see
Appendix B). We perform the attack against each of the
50 images and report aggregated results.
Benign vs. attack images. We start with a comparison
between benign and attack images. For each benign im-
age x˜, we randomly split its set of image variations into
a known partition (75%) and unknown partition (25%).
We repeat this procedure 50 times and report the distance
of each distorted image from the unknown partition to
the one-class model defined by the known partition. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows the average distance for each benign image
and repetition as well as the attack queries per image x˜.
The distances between benignly distorted and adversely
crafted images are well separable. Without further infor-
mation about the boundary, an attacker needs to use an
arbitrary localized boundary position. Thus, the gradient
calculation around that position leads to a large fraction
of queries that do not resemble a meaningful signal and
exhibit an abnormally high distance. This in turn allows
a one-class detector to differentiate between benign and
attack inputs.
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Figure 6: The upper plot compares the average distance from normally
distorted and adversely crafted images to a respective one-class model.
The middle plot shows the average PSNR of the 50 image outcomes of
the attack to the respective original, unwatermarked image as a function
of δ . The error bars depict the respective standard deviation. The lower
plot depicts the percentage of the attack images where the watermark is
not detectable anymore.
Random Decisions. We finally evaluate the impact of
random decisions outside the one-class model. Figure 6(b)
plots the Peak Signal To Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Fig-
ure 6(c) shows the percentage of successfully eliminated
watermarks from the 50 final attack outcomes as a func-
tion of threshold δ .
A threshold between 3000 and 10000 successfully dis-
torts the attack, such that the watermark is still detectable
in the final attack outcome and the visual quality decreases
substantially. A higher threshold, however, increases the
chances that the attack queries remain inside the one-class
model, so that an adversary can render the watermark
undetectable with a high visual quality again. A smaller
threshold increases the risk of false positives. Moreover, if
the model becomes too tight, the attack terminates around
the one-class boundary instead. This leads to increasing
PSNR values and an adversary could start to exploit the
one-class boundary instead. Overall, the results confirm
that a suitable threshold strongly impacts the attack with
regard to visual quality and watermark removal, and at
the same time reduces the risk of false positives.
We acknowledge that false positives may occur with
image distortions that are not considered in the one-class
model. Yet, the model represents an additional informa-
tion source for a watermark detector. To the best of our
knowledge, a similar defense strategy has not been pro-
posed for digital watermarking so far and in combination
with already existing defense mechanisms, we further
raise the bar for oracle and watermark-estimation attacks.
10
Security margin
per leaf
Decision
tree
boundaries
Security
margin
fw(x˜) = η
x˜
x
(a) Machine learning (b) Watermarking
Figure 7: Transfer from digital watermarking to machine learning. The right plot illustrates the concept of the security margin that spots a binary
search trying to enclose the boundary. The left plot shows its application to a decision tree. The region defined by each leaf has a security margin
where its width is adapted to the training data distribution (circles). In contrast, the queries from the tree extraction algorithm (squares) underline that
the attack needs to operate in the security margin to localize the decision boundary.
4.2 From Watermarking
to Machine Learning
We proceed with applying concepts from the field of wa-
termarking to machine learning. In particular, we demon-
strate that the concept of a stateful detector mitigates the
risk of model stealing by identifying sequences of ma-
licious queries. This provides online services offering
machine learning as a service new capabilities for fend-
ing off attacks. To begin with, we shortly summarize the
model extraction proposed by Trame`r et al. [56] for a
decision tree and then develop a stateful classifier as an
effective countermeasure. Finally, we present an empiri-
cal evaluation to demonstrate the practical feasibility of
this novel defense strategy.
Decision tree extraction. Trame`r et al. [56] reconstruct
decision trees by performing targeted queries on the APIs
provided by the BigML service. The attack is possible,
since the service does not only return the class label for a
submitted query but also a confidence score for a partic-
ular leaf node. This enables an adversary to distinguish
between the leaves. For each leaf and for each of its fea-
tures, a recursive binary search locates the leaf’s decision
boundary in that direction. As the binary search covers
the whole feature range, other leaf regions are discovered
as well and extracted subsequently. In this way, an ad-
versary can extract all possible paths of the decision tree.
Note that the binary search needs to fix all features except
for the one of interest, as otherwise the attack may miss a
leaf during the reconstruction.
Stateful decision tree. As a countermeasure to this at-
tack, we devise a defense that builds on a successful
protection technique from digital watermarking—a state-
ful detector [1, 55]. Figure 7(b) shows the concept as
proposed by Barni et al. [1]. A narrow stripe across the
decision boundary determines a security margin. The
detector does not only check for the presence of a water-
mark, but simultaneously counts the number of queries
falling inside this margin. An attacker performing a binary
search to enclose the boundary will necessarily create an
unusually large number of queries in the security margin.
The analysis of the input sequences therefore allows the
identification of unusual activity which mitigates the risk
of oracle and watermark-estimation attacks. The exact
parameters of the security margin are derived through sta-
tistical properties of the decision function [1]. Although
this defense strategy has been initially designed to pro-
tect watermark detectors, we demonstrate that it can be
extended to secure decision trees as well.
Figure 7(a) illustrates the transferred concept where
security margins are added to the boundaries of each tree
region. The width of these margins is determined for
each region and feature dimension separately depending
on the statistical distribution of the data. Overall, the
security margin is defined alongside the original decision
tree and does not require changes to its implementation.
Appendix C provides more information on the margin’s
creation process.
When the decision tree returns the predicted class for a
query, the stateful detector checks whether the query falls
inside the security margin. To determine whether the tree
is subject to an attack, we calculate a simple ratio: For
each leaf, we count the number of incoming queries. At
the same time, the leaf keeps record of the queries inside
the security margin. We denote by ϕ the ratio from the
security margin queries to the total number of queries,
averaged over all leaves. This ratio is an indicator for the
plausibility of the current input sequence. Figure 7(a) also
shows the typical query sequence from the tree extraction
algorithm (red squared). The adversary has to work in the
margin to localize the decision boundary, in contrast to
the distribution of benign queries.
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Dataset Original Attack Blocking Defense Random Resp. Defense Adapted AttackQ p Q p Q p Q p
Iris 108 1.00 38 0.09 * 0.09 4,412 1.00
Carseats 871 1.00 148 0.20 * 0.20 15,156 0.46
College 2,216 1.00 244 0.10 * 0.10 8,974 0.08
Orange Juice 4,804 1.00 846 0.20 * 0.20 86,354 0.48
Wine Quality 9,615 1.00 978 0.11 * 0.11 37,406 0.11
Table 2: Effectiveness of the Security Margin Defense for different attack variations and possible reactions after detecting the attack. Q denotes
the number of queries, p the percentage of successfully extracted leaves. Without any defense, the original extraction algorithm from Trame`r et al.
extracts the whole tree (p = 1). In contrast, with the security margin, the detector can spot an attack and block further access before the whole tree is
reconstructed (p6 0.2). If the adversary adapts the attack by sending cover queries with random values, the attack chances increases, but the full
reconstruction is still not possible for larger datasets.
Experimental setup. To evaluate this defense in prac-
tice, we use the publicly available tree-stealing implemen-
tation by Trame`r et al. [56]. Table 3 summarizes our used
datasets. We divide each dataset into a training set (50%)
and test set (50%), where we use the first for learning a
decision tree and calibrating the security margins. We
repeat this process 5 times and present aggregated results
in the following. The detector assumes an attack if the
query ratio ϕ exceeds the threshold τ = 0.3, estimated by
a prior cross-validation.
Dataset Samples Features ∅ Leaves
Iris 150 4 4.6
Carseats 400 8 13.2
College 777 17 18.8
Orange Juice 1,070 11 59.0
Wine Quality 1,599 11 89.4
Table 3: Dataset for evaluation. The number of leaves from the learned
decision tree are averaged over the repetitions.
Defense Evaluation. We first examine the security mar-
gin under benign and attack queries, where Table 2 reports
the results for the corresponding experiments. In the first
step, we make use of the test set to simulate the queries
of an honest user. In this way, we can determine the risk
of false positives, that is, declaring that an honest input
sequence is malicious. The final query ratio ϕ after sub-
mitting the complete sequence was not higher than 0.2 in
all datasets, so that the stateful detector does not mark a
benign query sequence as attack by mistake.
Next, we run the tree-stealing attack against the learned
tree without and with the security margin defense. In the
latter case, we consider two reactions after that an attack
sequence is detected: (a) the tree blocks further access,
(b) the tree returns random decisions. To determine the
knowledge gain by the adversary, Table 2 reports the per-
centage of successfully extracted leaves p. The blocking
strategy allows the tree to block the tree extraction at the
very beginning. With random decisions, the attack’s bi-
nary search recursively locates an exponential number
of boundaries erroneously. We stopped the attack after
1 Million queries (marked by *).
Counter-Attack Evaluation. As a counter-reaction, an
adversary can in turn submit cover queries outside the
security margin so that the query ratio ϕ ideally remains
below the threshold. There are, however, two practical
problems. Without knowledge of the training data dis-
tribution, the adversary cannot know where a decision
boundary could be located and thus where the margin
could be. Another problem is that the attacker needs to
control the ratio in almost each leaf. It is not sufficient to
send just one fixed well-chosen cover query all the time,
since this query would only affect one leaf. These two
problems complicate the design of cover queries.
We therefore let the attacker create cover queries by
selecting random values in the range of each feature. Ta-
ble 2 shows the performance of this adapted attack where
an adversary sends 40 cover queries for each tree extrac-
tion query. Still, the whole tree cannot be extracted. Only
half of the leaves are extracted before the detector spots
the attack and blocks further access.
We finally consider a stronger attacker who knows a
certain percentage of the training data. This is not unreal-
istic, if an adversary can make some assumptions about
possible training data. The attacker can make use of the
leaked training data as cover queries. Table 4 summarizes
the percentage of extracted leaves p for varying amounts
of known training data and cover queries. If just 10%
of the data are known, even 40 cover queries between
each attack query do not suffice to extract the whole tree.
However, if the adversary knows more data points, the
cover queries spread over all leaves more equally and the
attack chances start to increase.
Overall, our evaluation demonstrates that the proposed
defense can effectively mitigate the risk of model stealing
based on the history of queries. While this defense is only
a first step in hindering model-extraction attacks, we show
that the concept of a stateful analysis brings in a new de-
fense strategy that in combination with other protections,
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Dataset Cover Percentage train. data
Queries 10 20 30 40 50
Iris
1x 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
5x 0.64 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.94
40x 0.76 0.91 0.94 0.97 1.00
Carseats
1x 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.30
5x 0.39 0.60 0.69 0.82 0.89
40x 0.50 0.87 0.97 1.00 1.00
College
1x 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
5x 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.32
40x 0.29 0.64 0.85 0.94 1.00
Orange Juice
1x 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
5x 0.39 0.63 0.88 0.98 0.99
40x 0.46 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wine Quality
1x 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24
5x 0.33 0.55 0.88 0.98 1.00
40x 0.43 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 4: Percentage of extracted leaves with an informed attacker who
knows a certain percentage of the training data. Results are shown for
different numbers of cover queries that are sent between each attack
query from the tree extraction algorithm.
such as a line search detection as proposed for watermark-
ing [1], can lower the chances of reconstructing a model
in reasonable time. As our defense can be implemented
alongside an existing classifier, online services such as
BigML can easily deploy our defense in practice.
5 Discussion
Adversarial machine learning and digital watermarking
are vivid research fields that have established a broad
range of methods and concepts. However, one can ob-
serve the following asymmetry: the former community
has focused on white-box attacks, while the latter has
extensively studied the black-box threat. Although recent
research in machine learning has started to also study
black-box attacks more thoroughly [39, 40, 56], existing
insights from digital watermarking potentially bring forth
novel ideas. The other way round, we also show that
knowledge from machine learning can help to mitigate
attacks against watermarks.
The presented unified view opens interesting directions
for future work. The comparison of defenses between
both fields in Section 3.5, for instance, discloses that
stateful detection strategies have not been considered in
machine learning yet. While we successfully transferred
the security margin approach in this paper, a line search
detection based on a PCA, for example, could further
mitigate model-extraction attacks. On the other side, the
various strategies, such as adaptive re-learning [56], that
have been used successfully against classifiers mark a
potential threat for watermark detectors as well.
Furthermore, the watermarking community has con-
ducted different contests, where researchers could at-
tack and defend watermarking schemes under practical
conditions, such as the “Break Our Watermarking Sys-
tem” (BOWS) competition. These contests have pro-
moted a variety of publications that reveal shortcomings
of existing protection techniques and introduce novel de-
fenses [e.g. 4, 13, 16, 61, 62, 64], such as the strong wa-
termarking scheme Broken Arrows [21]. Based on our
unified view, we encourage the organization of a sim-
ilar contest for adversarial machine learning. By im-
posing researchers into the role of an attacker in a real
scenario without perfect knowledge, previously unknown
questions and insights often come to light. Sˇrndic´ and
Laskov [59], for instance, demonstrate the feasibility to
evade a publicly available PDF malware classifier with
the insight that full knowledge of the classifier features is
not necessary. The contest could be structured similarly
to watermarking contests in different episodes, with each
providing a different level of knowledge about a defense
or attack (see Appendix D).
Finally, we note that machine learning and watermark-
ing are not the only research areas that have to cope with
an adversary. The identified similarities between both
research fields can be seen as part of a bigger problem:
Adversarial Signal Processing [2]. More fields such as
information or multimedia forensics also deal with an
adversary’s presence and to our knowledge the transfer
of concepts between and to these areas has not been ad-
dressed so far.
6 Conclusion
Developing analysis methods for an adversarial environ-
ment is a challenging task: First, these methods need to
provide correct results even if parts of their input are ma-
nipulated and, second, these methods should protect from
known as well as future attacks. The research fields of
adversarial learning and digital watermarking both have
tackled this challenge and developed a remarkable set of
defenses for operating in an adversarial environment.
In this paper, we show that both lines of research share
similarities which have been overlooked by previous work
and enable transferring concepts from one field to the
other. By means of a systematization of attacks, we are
able to transform defenses for learning methods to the
domain of watermarking and vice versa. This not only
opens new perspective for designing joint defenses, but
also allows for combining techniques from both fields
that have not been previously coupled.
As part of our analysis, we identify interesting direc-
tions of future research that enable the two communities
to learn from each other and combine the “best of both
worlds”. As one example of these directions, we particu-
larly encourage the organization of a public competition
for adversarial machine learning, where attacks and de-
fenses are put to the test in a competitive manner.
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A Linear Watermark Detector
This section illustrates the watermarking process with a
simple watermarking scheme. The process can be gener-
ally divided into two phases: embedding and detection.
Let us, for instance, consider the additive spectrum water-
marking scheme which is also the embedding scheme used
in the image example from Figure 2. In this scheme, the
watermarked version x˜ of a signal x is created by adding a
watermarking vector w ∈ RN onto x element-wise, that is,
x˜ = x+w . (4)
The watermark w usually represents a random pattern. In
order to decide whether a signal contains the particular
watermark, a linear correlation detector can be employed
that uses the following decision function
fw(x˜) = x˜ᵀw . (5)
The output is a weighted sum between x˜ and the water-
mark w. If watermark and signal match, the correlation
exceeds a pre-defined threshold η . Geometrically, each
signal corresponds to a point in a vector space where the
watermark describes a decision boundary, as shown in
Figure 8. The result are two subspaces, one for the water-
mark’s presence, one for its absence. The detection thus
works by determining which subspace an input signal is
currently in.
w
Linear decision boundary
fw(x˜) = η
C+
C−
x˜
w
x
Figure 8: Geometrical view on the embedding and detection process of
a simple watermarking scheme.
B Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack
This section briefly recaps the Blind Newton Sensitivity
Attack (BNSA) that interprets the watermark removal as
a non-linear optimization problem [12]:
min d(t) (6)
subject to fw(x˜′) = fw(x˜+ t) = η . (7)
The objective function d(t) measures the changes t on
the image x˜. For example, the squared Euclidean norm
d(t) = ‖t‖22 minimizes the length of t and therefore the
necessary pixel changes. At the same time, the optimal
solution must satisfy the constraint that the detector does
not detect the watermark. A position on the boundary is
here sufficient, so that Equation (7) restricts the decision
function to η .
The adversary, however, does not know the function
fw(x˜′), since the watermark w is kept secret. Although
only a binary detector output is observable, an attack is
yet possible. To this end, Comesan˜a et al. rewrite the
optimization problem into an unconstrained version:
arg min
t∈RN
d(h(t)). (8)
The function h(t) reflects the prior constraint by mapping
t to the decision boundary. To this end, a bisection al-
gorithm can be used to find a scalar α such that αt lies
on the decision boundary. There is, however, another
problem. As h(t) has to map each input vector to the
boundary explicitly by running the bisection algorithm
respectively, a closed form to solve the problem is not
applicable. Therefore numeric iterative methods such as
Newton’s method or gradient descent have to be used as
Figure 9 exemplifies.
The attack starts with a random direction to locate the
decision boundary. After calculating an image at the
boundary, it slightly changes the vector at one position,
maps the vector to the boundary again and records the
distance through this change. By repeating this procedure
for each feature direction, the attack is able to calculate
the gradient at this boundary position. This step yields the
direction in which the necessary changes d(t) decreases
fastest. In this way, the attack is able to locate a boundary
position that is closer to x˜ than the previous position.
This process can be repeated, but in the case of a linear
boundary, the algorithm finishes after one iteration with
the fewest necessary changes.
In summary, the attack does not require a priori knowl-
edge about the detector’s decision function and works
only with a binary output. Although the attack only con-
verges to an optimal solution for convex boundaries, it
has been used against various watermarking schemes
with even polynomial and fractalized decision bound-
aries [12, 13, 55].
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Figure 9: Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack. Queries around a boundary
position reveal the function’s gradient at this position to minimize the
distance between the manipulated sample and the original one.
C Security Margin Construction
The security margin’s construction works as follows: First,
we choose a tree region and select the training data that
fall inside this particular region. Next, we estimate the
distribution of the selected training data at each dimen-
sion through a kernel-density estimation. In this way, no
a priori assumptions about their distribution are required.
Finally, the distribution in each dimension is used to de-
fine the margin at the boundary in this dimension. To this
end, we set the margin to the feature value where the prob-
ability of occurrence is smaller than a certain threshold.
In Figure 7(a), for example, the top right tree regions has
a smaller security margin, since more training data are
near the boundary. On the contrary, the most left region
exhibits fewer training samples near the boundary, so that
a larger margin can be defined. By defining the security
margin in this statistical way, we can control the false
alarm rate that a honest query falls inside the margin. We
repeat the process for each tree region.
D BOWS Contest
“Break Our Watermarking System” or BOWS is a contest
that has been held twice in the watermarking commu-
nity. The latest contest is divided into three subsequent
episodes, where only the last episode reveals the underly-
ing watermarking scheme.
1. At the beginning of the contest, 3 watermarked im-
ages are available together with an online watermark
detector that allows 30 calls per day. This episode
models an attacker with limited knowledge and ca-
pabilities. The participants are required to operate
with few queries and need to carefully construct their
attacks.
2. In the next episode, the daily rate limited is dropped
and the participants can perform different forms of
oracle and watermark-estimation attacks against the
detector. The episode models a stronger attacker, yet
only 3 images are available for inferring the pattern
embedded by the watermarking scheme.
3. Finally, the same watermark is embedded into
10,000 images and the underlying watermarking
scheme is released. This episode models a very
strong adversary with full knowledge of the scheme
together with access to a large set of images. Ulti-
mately, a watermarking scheme should remain se-
cure even in this setting.
For each episode, a hall of fame on the respective web-
site documents the participant’s success regarding the
image quality and the launched attacks. Further informa-
tion on the design of both contests are provided by Piva
and Barni [45] as well as Furon and Bas [21], respectively.
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